The Battle of Jutland 1916
- Casualties Listed by Ship.
Click on the ship name for the Roll.
1. the numbers in brackets indicate civilians and are
included in totals.
( also see: list of
civilian deaths )
2. Casualties sustained prior to the loss of ship.
map of the battle zone (off site)
Above; the ubiquitous Jutland medallion, struck by
Spink and Sons in 1916. Found in a variety of sizes and metals.
This one; white metal, 45mm diameter.
RECEIVED BY BRITISH SHIPS1
Number of hits by
Date of completion of
Hit by a torpedo.
Battle Cruisers :
Light Cruisers :
Flotilla Leader :
Also damaged by collision.
1 7 June
Also damaged by collision.
1 Only those ships which required dockyard repairs
As published in the
Third Supplement (dated July 6th, 1916) of the London Gazette of 4th
* All times given in this
report are Greenwich mean time.
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe's Despatch on the Battle of Jutland.
ADMIRALTY, 6th JULY, 1916
The following Despatch has been received from Admiral Sir John
Jellicoe, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet,
reporting the action in the North Sea on 31st May, 1916 :—*
24th June, 1916.
SIR,—Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty that the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on
31st May, 1916, to the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast
The ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the general policy
of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left its bases on
the previous day, in accordance with instructions issued by me.
In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31st May, the 1st and 2nd
Battle Cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons
and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas, supported
by the 5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my directions,
scouting to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which was accompanied
by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons,
4th Light Cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th and 12th Flotillas.
The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after
the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly course
steered by our advanced force during the first hour after commencing
their action with the enemy battle cruisers. This was, of course,
unavoidable, as had our battle cruisers not followed the enemy to
the southward the main fleets would never have been in contact.
The Battle-cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Vice-Admiral Sir David
Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., and admirably supported by the ships
of the Fifth Battle Squadron under Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas,
M.V.O., fought an action under, at times, disadvantageous
conditions, especially in regard to light, in a manner that was in
keeping with the best traditions of the service.
The following extracts from the report of Sir David Beatty give
the course of events before the Battle Fleet came upon the scene : —
At 2.20 p.m. reports were received from Galatea
(Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O., A.D.C., indicating
the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was
immediately altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to
place my force between the enemy and his base.
At 2.35 p.m. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the
eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward and
eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the Horn
Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly altered
to the eastward and subsequently to north-eastward, the enemy being
sighted at 3.31 p.m. Their force consisted of five battle cruisers.
After the first report of the enemy, the 1st and 3rd Light
Cruiser Squadrons changed their direction, and, without waiting for
orders, spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of
the Battle Cruiser Squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we
had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light
cruisers at long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser
Squadron had come in at high speed, and was able to take station
ahead of the battle cruisers by the time we turned to E.S.E., the
course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the
work of the Light Cruiser Squadrons was excellent, and of great
From a report from Galatea at 2.25 p.m. it was evident
that the enemy force was considerable, and not merely an isolated
unit of light cruisers, so at 2.45 p.m. I ordered Engadine
(Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson) to send up a seaplane and
scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out very quickly, and by 3.8.
p.m. a seaplane, with Flight Lieutenant F. J. Rutland, R.N., as
pilot, and Assistant Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as observer, was
well under way ; her first reports of the enemy were received in
Engadine about 3.30 p.m. Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly
very low, and in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the
seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 feet within 3,000 yards of
them, the light cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that
would bear. This in no way interfered with the clarity of their
reports, and both Flight Lieutenant Rutland and Assistant Paymaster
Trewin are to be congratulated on their achievement, which indicates
that seaplanes under such circumstances are of distinct value.
At 3.30 p.m. I increased speed to 25 knots, and formed line of
battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st
Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th
Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E. slightly
converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards,
and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The
5th Battle Squadron who had conformed to our movements, were now
bearing N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good,
the sun behind us and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy and his
base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good.
At 3.48 p.m. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards,
both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was
altered to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E., the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to
At 4.8 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened
fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy's fire now seemed to
slacken. The destroyer Landrail (Lieutenant-Commander Francis
E. H. G. Hobart), of 9th Flotilla, who was on our port beam, trying
to take station ahead, sighted the periscope of a submarine on her
port quarter. Though causing considerable inconvenience from smoke,
the presence of Lydiard (Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith) and
Landrail undoubtedly preserved the battle cruisers from
closer submarine attack. Nottingham (Captain Charles B.
Miller) also reported a submarine on the starboard beam.
Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, Nestor
(Commander the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham), Nomad
(Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield), Nicator (Lieutenant
Jack E. A. Mocatta), Narborough (Lieutenant-Commander
Geoffrey Corlett), Pelican (Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A.
Beattie), Petard (Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. 0. Thomson),
Obdurate (Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams), Nerissa
(Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge), with Moorsom
(Commander John C. Hodgson), and Morris (Lieutenant-Commander
Edward S. Graham), of 10th Flotilla, Turbulent
(Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart), and Termagant
(Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake), of the 9th Flotilla,
having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when
opportunity offered, moved out at 4.15 p.m., simultaneously with a
similar movement on the part of the enemy destroyers. The attack was
carried out in the most gallant manner, and with great
determination. Before arriving at a favourable position to fire
torpedoes, they intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light
cruiser and fifteen destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close
quarters, with the result that the enemy were forced to retire on
their battle cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk, and having
their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in
this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle cruisers was
rendered less effective, owing to some of the destroyers having
dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore
unfavourable for torpedo attack.
Nestor, Nomad and Nicator, gallantly led by
Commander the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham, of Nestor, pressed
home their attack on the battle cruisers and fired two torpedoes at
them, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's secondary
armament. Nomad was badly hit, and apparently remained
stopped between the lines. Subsequently Nestor and Nicator
altered course to the S.E., and in a short time, the opposing
battle cruisers having turned 16 points, found themselves within
close range of a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted,
though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and their position
favourable for torpedo attack fired a torpedo at the second dish of
the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire
their fourth torpedo, Nestior was badly hit and swung to
starboard, Nicator altering course inside he rto avoid
collision, and thereby being prevented from firing the last torpedo.
Nicator made good her escape and subsequently rejoined the
Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. Nestor remained stopped, but was
afloat when last seen. Moorsom also carried out an attack on
the enemy's battle fleet.
Petard, Nerissa, Turbulent and Termagant also
pressed home their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers, firing
torpedoes after the engagement with enemy destroyers. Petard
reports that all her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy's line,
while Nerissa states that one torpedo appeared to strike the
rear ship. These destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit
pervading His Majesty's Navy, and were worthy of its highest
traditions. I propose to bring to your notice a recommendation of
Commander Bingham and other Officers for some recognition of their
From 4.15 to 4.43 p.m. the conflict between the opposing battle
cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th Battle
Squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at very
long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of
that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 p.m. the third
enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the
north-eastward had become considerably reduced, and the outline of
the ships very indistinct.
At 4.38 p.m. Southampton (Commodore William E.
Goodenough M.V.O., A.D.C.) reported the enemy's Battle Fleet ahead.
The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 p.m. the enemy's Battle
Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 points in succession to
starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead them
towards the Battle Fleet. The enemy battle cruisers altered course
shortly afterwards, and the action continued. Southampton,
with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, held on to the southward to
observe. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy Battle
Fleet, and came under a very heavy but ineffective fire.
Southampton's reports were most valuable. The 5th Battle
Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the
enemy battle cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy
Battle Fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter
course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, in Barham
(Captain Arthur W. Craig), this squadron supported us brilliantly
At 4.57 the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and came
under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy Battle Fleet.
Fearless (Captain (D) Charles D. Roper), with the destroyers of
1st Flotilla, joined the battle cruisers, and, when speed admitted,
took station ahead. Champion (Captain (D) James U. Farie),
with 13th Flotilla, took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At 5
p.m. the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been
on the southerly course, took station on my starboard bow ; the 2nd
Light Cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.
The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being
silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the enemy
were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly at
intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van
at about 6 p.m. Between 5 and 6 p.m. the action continued on a
northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this
time the enemy received very severe punishment, and one of their
battle cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged
condition. This came under my personal observation, and was
corroborated by Princess Royal (Captain Walter H. Cowan,
M.V.O., D.S.O.) and Tiger (Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.).
Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5.
p.m. Onslow (Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey) and
Moresby (Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison), who had been
detached to assist Engadine with the seaplane, rejoined the
battle cruiser squadrons and took station on the starboard (engaged)
bow of Lion (Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O.). At 5.10
p.m. Moresby, being 2 points before the beam of the leading
enemy ship, fired a torpedo at a ship in their line. Eight minutes
later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the
sixth ship in the line. Moresby then passed between the lines
to clear the range of smoke, and rejoined Champion. In
corroboration of this, Fearless reports having seen an enemy
heavy ship heavily on fire at about 5.10 p.m., and shortly
afterwards a huge cloud of smoke and steam.
At 5.35 p.m. our course was N.N.E., and the estimated position
of the Battle Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the
northeastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He
was gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment
at the head of his line, and probably acting on information received
from his light cruisers which had sighted and were engaged with the
Third Battle Cruiser Squadron.
Possibly Zeppelins were present also. At 5.50 p.m. British
cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 p.m. the leading
battleships of the Battle Fleet, bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon
altered course to east, and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought
the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to you
that the enemy battle cruisers bore south-east. At this time only
three of the enemy battle cruisers were visible, closely followed by
battleships of the ' Koenig ' class.
At about 6.5 p.m. Onslow, being on the engaged bow of
Lion, sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000
yards from us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes.
Onslow at once closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a
range of from 4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits.
Onslow then closed the enemy battle cruisers, and orders were
given for all torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck
amidships by a heavy shell, with the
only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his torpedoes had
gone, the Commanding Officer proceeded to retire at slow speed.
Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he closed with the
light cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The enemy's
Battle Fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes were
fired at them and must have crossed the enemy's track. Damage then
caused Onslow to stop.
At 7.15 p.m. Defender (Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R.
Palmer), whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots, while on the
disengaged side of the battle cruisers, by a shell which damaged her
foremost boiler, closed Onslow and took her in tow. Shells
were falling all round them during this operation, which, however,
was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the
ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two
struggled on together until 1 p.m. 1st June, when Onslow was
transferred to tugs. I consider the performances of these two
destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending
Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Tovey, of Onslow, and
Lieutenant-Commander L. R. Palmer, of Defender, for special
recognition. Onslow was possibly the destroyer referred to
by the Rear-Admiral Commanding 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron as
follows :—' Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of
a destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled
condition soon after 6 p.m. She apparently was able to struggle
ahead again, and made straight for the ' Derfflinger ' to attack
PROCEEDINGS OF BATTLE FLEET AND
THIRD BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON.
On receipt of the information that the enemy had been sighted,
the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying cruiser and
destroyer force, proceeded at full speed on a S.E. by S. course to
close the Battle Cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that elapsed
before the arrival of the Battle Fleet on the scene the steaming
qualities of the older battleships were severely tested. Great
credit is due to the engine-room departments for the manner in which
they, as always, responded to the call, the whole Fleet maintaining
a speed in excess of the trial speeds of some of the older vessels.
The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral the
Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., which was in advance
of the Battle Fleet, was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty. At
5.30 p.m. this squadron observed flashes of gunfire and heard the
sound of guns to the south-westward. Rear-Admiral Hood sent the
Chester (Captain Robert N. Lawson) to investigate, and this ship
engaged three or four enemy light cruisers at about 5.45 p.m. The
engagement lasted for about twenty minutes, during which period
handled his vessel with great skill against heavy odds, and,
although the ship suffered considerably in casualties, her fighting
and steaming qualities were unimpaired, and at about 6.5 p.m. she
rejoined the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron.
The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron had turned to the northwestward,
and at 6.10 p.m. sighted our battle cruisers, the squadron taking
station ahead of the Lion at 6.21 p.m. in accordance with the
orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle Cruiser Fleet. He
reports as follows : —
I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out
magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action
ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval
ancestors. At 6.25 p.m. I altered course to the E.S.E. in support of
the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000
yards from the enemy's leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire
into her and caused her to turn to the westward of south. At the
same time I made a report to you of the bearing and distance of the
enemy battle fleet.
By 6.50 p.m. the battle cruisers were clear of our leading
battle squadron then bearing about N.N.W. 3 miles, and I ordered the
Third Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern and reduced
to 18 knots. The visibility at this time was very indifferent, not
more than 4 miles, and the enemy ships were temporarily lost sight
of. It is interesting to note that after 6 p.m., although the
visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favourable to us
than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly,
enabling us to punish them very severely and establish a definite
superiority over them. From the report of other ships and my own
observation it was clear that the enemy suffered considerable
damage, battle cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their
line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the
majority of our battle cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle
Squadron was also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral
Evan-Thomas shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can
be safely said that his magnificent squadron wrought great
From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O.,
the Third Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station
on our starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 p.m. attacked
with the torpedo Falmouth (Captain John D. Edwards) and
Yarmouth (Captain Thomas D. Pratt) both fired torpedoes at the
leading enemy battle cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo
hit, as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light
Cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with
gunfire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the
fighting efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired.
Rear-Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and
effective attack. Indomitable (Captain Francis W. Kennedy)
reports that about this time one of the ' Derfflinger ' class fell
out of the enemy's line."
Meanwhile, at 5.45 p.m., the report of guns had become audible to
me, and at 5.55 p.m. flashes were visible from ahead round to the
starboard beam, although in the mist no ships could be
distinguished, and the position of the enemy's battle fleet could
not be determined. The difference in estimated position by "
reckoning " between Iron Duke (Captain Frederic C. Dreyer,
C.B.) and Lion, which was inevitable under the circumstances,
added to the uncertainty of the general situation.
Shortly after 5.55 p.m. some of the cruisers ahead, under
Rear-Admirals Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O., and Sir Robert Arbuthnot,
Bt., M.V.O., were seen to be in action, and reports received show
that Defence, flagship (Captain Stanley V. Ellis), and
Warrior (Captain Vincent B. Molteno), of the First Cruiser
Squadron, engaged an enemy light cruiser at this time. She was
subsequently observed to sink.
At 6 p.m. Canterbury (Captain Percy M. R. Royds), which
ship was in company with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, had
engaged enemy light cruisers which were firing heavily on the
torpedo-boat destroyer Shark (Commander Loftus W. Jones),
Acasta (Lieutenant-Commander John 0. Barron), and Christopher
(Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr) ; as a result of this
engagement the Shark was sunk.
At 6 p.m. vessels, afterwards seen to be our battle cruisers,
were sighted by Marlborough bearing before the starboard
beam of the battle fleet.
At the same time the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser
Fleet, reported to me the position of the enemy battle cruisers, and
at 6.14 p.m. reported the position of the enemy battle fleet.
At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle
cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was necessary to
ensure that our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels.
I formed the battle fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir
David Beatty's report, and during deployment the fleets became
engaged. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile formed the battle cruisers
ahead of the battle fleet.
The divisions of the battle fleet were led by : —
Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
Thomas Jerram, K.C.B.
Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.
Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, C.B.
Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson,
Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.
At 6.16 p.m. Defence and Warrior were observed
passing down between the British and German Battle Fleets under a
very heavy fire. Defence disappeared, and Warrior
passed to the rear disabled.
It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during his engagement
with the enemy's light cruisers and in his desire to complete their
destruction, was not aware of the approach of the enemy's heavy
ships, owing to the mist, until he found himself in
close proximity to the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his
ships they were caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not
known when Black Prince (Captain Thomas P. Bonham), of the
same squadron, was sunk, but a wireless signal was received from
her between 8 and 9 p.m.
The First Battle Squadron became engaged during deployment, the
Vice-Admiral opening fire at 6.17 p.m. on a battleship of the "
Kaiser " class. The other Battle Squadrons, which had previously
been firing at an enemy light cruiser, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on
battleships of the " Koenig " class.
At 6.6 p.m. the Rear-Admiral Commanding Fifth Battle Squadron,
then in company with the battle cruisers, had sighted the starboard
wing division of the battle fleet on the port bow of Barham,
and the first intention of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas was to form
ahead of the remainder of the battle fleet, but on realising the
direction of deployment he was compelled to form astern, a manoeuvre
which was well executed by the squadron under a heavy fire from the
enemy battle fleet. An accident to Warspite's steering gear
caused her helm to become jammed temporarily and took the ship in
the direction of the enemy's line, during which time she was hit
several times. Clever handling enabled Captain Edward M. Phillpotts
to extricate his ship from a somewhat awkward situation.
Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was
possible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy's battle
line. Towards the van only some four or five ships were ever visible
at once. More could be seen from the rear squadron, but never more
than eight to twelve.
The action between the battle fleets lasted intermittently from
6.17 p.m. to 8.20 p.m. at ranges between 9,000 and 12,000 yards,
during which time the British Fleet made alterations of course from
S.E. by E. to W. in the endeavour to close. The enemy constantly
turned away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks
and smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt, and
the alterations of course had the effect of bringing the British
Fleet (which commenced the action in a position of advantage on the
bow of the enemy) to a quarterly bearing from the enemy battle line,
but at the same time placed us between the enemy and his bases.
At 6.55 p.m. Iron Duke passed the wreck of Invincible
(Captain Arthur L. Cay), with Badger (Commander C. A.
During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High Sea
Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective fire
kept up by the battleships and battle cruisers of the Grand Fleet
caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were seen to be
constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the line and at
least one to sink. The enemy's return fire at this period was not
effective, and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant.
THE BATTLE CRUISERS IN THE VAN.
Sir David Beatty reports : —
At 7.6 p.m. I received a signal from you that the course of the
Fleet was south. Subsequently signals were received up to 8.46 p.m.
showing that the course of the Battle Fleet was to the
Between 7 and 7.12 p.m. we hauled round gradually to S.W. by S.
to regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 p.m. again sighted them
at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time
were two battle cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the '
Koenig ' class. No doubt more continued the line to the
northward, but that was all that could be seen. The visibility
having improved considerably as the sun descended below the clouds,
we re-engaged at 7.17 p.m. and increased speed to 22 knots. At 7.32
p.m. my course was S.W., speed 18 knots, the leading enemy
battleship bearing N.W. by W. Again, after a very short time, the
enemy showed signs of punishment, one ship being on fire, while
another appeared to drop right astern. The destroyers at the head of
the enemy's line emitted volumes of grey smoke, covering their
capital ships as with a pall, under cover of which they turned away,
and at 7.45 p.m. we lost sight of them.
At 7.58 p.m. I ordered the First and Third Light Cruiser
Squadrons to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the
enemy's line, and at 8.20 p.m. we altered course to west in support.
We soon located two battle cruisers and battleships, and were
heavily engaged at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading
ship was hit repeatedly by Lion, and turned away eight
points, emitting very high flames and with a heavy list to port.
Princess Royal set fire to a three-funnelled battleship. New
Zealand (Captain John F. E. Green) and Indomitable report
that the third ship, which they both engaged, hauled out of the
line, heeling over and on fire. The mist which now came down
enveloped them, and Falmouth reported they were last seen at
8.38 p.m. steaming to the westward.
At 8.40 p.m. all our battle cruisers felt a heavy shock as if
struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As,
however, examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an
occurrence, it is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a
I continued on a south-westerly course with my light cruisers
spread until 9.24 p.m. Nothing further being sighted, I assumed that
the enemy were to the north-westward, and that we had established
ourselves well between him and his base. Minotaur (Captain
Arthur C. S. H. D'Aeth) was at this time bearing north 5 miles, and
I asked her the position of the leading battle squadron of the
Battle Fleet. Her reply was that it was not in sight, but was last
seen bearing N.N.E. I kept you informed of my position, course, and
speed, also of the bearing of the enemy.
In view of the gathering darkness, and the
fact that our strategical position was such as to make it appear
certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under most
I did not consider it desirable or proper to close the enemy Battle
Fleet during the dark hours. I therefore concluded that I should be
carrying out your wishes by turning to the course of the Fleet,
reporting to you that I had done so."
DETAILS OF BATTLE FLEET ACTION.
As was anticipated, the German Fleet
appeared to rely very much on torpedo attacks, which were favoured
by the low visibility and by the fact that we had arrived in the
position of a " following " or " chasing " fleet. A large number of torpedoes were
fired, but only one took effect (on Marlborough), and even in
this case the ship was able to remain in the line and to continue
the action. The enemy's efforts to keep out of effective gun range
were aided by the weather conditions, which were ideal for the
purpose. Two separate destroyer attacks were made by the enemy.
The First Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney.
came into action at 6.17p.m. with the enemy's Third Battle Squadron,
at a range of about 11,000 yards, and administered severe
punishment, both to the battleships and to the battle cruisers and
light cruisers, which were also engaged. The fire of Marlborough
(Captain George P. Ross) was particularly rapid and effective.
This ship commenced at 6.17 p.m. by firing seven salvoes at a ship
of the " Kaiser " class, then engaged a cruiser and again a
battleship, and at 6.54 she was hit by a torpedo and took up a
considerable list to starboard, but reopened at 7.3 p.m. at a
cruiser and at 7.12 p.m. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of
the " Koenig " class, hitting her frequently until she turned out of
the line. The manner in which this effective fire was kept up in
spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused by the torpedo
was most creditable to the ship and a very fine example to the
The range decreased during the course of the action to 9,000
yards. The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy's return
fire than the remainder of the battle fleet with the exception of
the Fifth Battle Squadron. Colossus (Captain Alfred D. P. R.
Pound) was hit but was not seriously damaged, and other ships were
straddled with fair frequency.
In the Fourth Battle Squadron—in which squadron my flagship
Iron Duke was placed—Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee leading
one of the divisions—the enemy engaged was the squadron consisting
of " Koenig " and " Kaiser " class and some of the battle cruisers,
as well as disabled cruisers and light cruisers. The mist rendered
range-taking a difficult matter, but the fire of the squadron was
effective. Iron Duke, having previously fired at a
light-cruiser between the lines, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on a
battleship of the " Koenig " class at a range of 12,000 yards. The
latter was very quickly straddled, and hitting commenced at the
second salvo and only ceased when the target ship turned away. The
rapidity with which hitting was established
was most creditable to the excellent gunnery organisation of the
flagship, so ably commanded by my Flag Captain, Captain Frederic C.
The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed
at enemy battle cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the
mist. Hits were observed to take effect on several ships.
The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir
Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the " Kaiser " or "
Koenig " classes between 6.30 and 7.20 p.m., and fired also at an
enemy battle cruiser which had dropped back apparently severely
During the action between the battle fleets the Second Cruiser
Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O.,
with the addition of Duke of Edinburgh (Captain Henry
Blackett) of the First Cruiser Squadron, occupied a position at the
van, and acted as a connecting link between the battle fleet and the
battle cruiser fleet. This squadron, although it carried out useful
work, did not have an opportunity of coming into action.
The attached cruisers Boadicea (Captain Louis C. S.
Woollcombe, M.V.O.), Active (Captain Percy Withers),
Blanche (Captain John M. Casement), and Bellona (Captain
Arthur B. S. Dutton) carried out their duties as repeating-ships
with remarkable rapidity and accuracy under difficult conditions.
The Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles E. Le
Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to attack
enemy destroyers at 7.20 p.m., and again at 8.18 p.m., when they
supported the Eleventh Flotilla, which had moved out under Commodore
James R. P. Hawksley, M.V.O., to attack. On each occasion the Fourth
Light Cruiser Squadron was very well handled by Commodore Le
Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their
object was attained, although with some loss in the second attack,
when the ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy battle fleet
at between 6,500 and 8,000 yards. The Calliope (Commodore Le
Mesurier) was hit several times, but did not sustain serious damage,
although, I regret to say, she had several casualties. The light
cruisers attacked the enemy's battleships with torpedoes at this
time, and an explosion on board a ship of the " Kaiser " class was
seen at 8.40 p.m.
During these destroyer attacks four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers
were sunk by the gun-fire of battleships, light cruisers and
After the arrival of the British Battle Fleet the enemy's tactics
were of a nature generally to avoid further action, in which they
were favoured by the conditions of visibility.
At 9 p.m. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat of
torpedo boat-destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching
darkness made it necessary for me to dispose the fleet for the
night, with a
view to its safety from such attacks, whilst providing for a renewal
of action at daylight. I accordingly manoeuvred to remain between
the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position in
which they would afford protection to the fleet from destroyer
attack, and at the same time be favourably situated for attacking
the enemy's heavy ships.
NIGHT ATTACKS BY FLOTILLAS.
During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked, but
the Fourth, Eleventh and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore
Hawkesley and Captains Charles J. Wintour and Anselan J. B.
Stirling, delivered a series of very gallant and successful attacks
on the enemy, causing him heavy losses.
It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth
Flotilla occurred, including that of Tipperary, with the
gallant leader of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his
flotilla to a high pitch of perfection, and although suffering
severely from the fire of the enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels
was taken, and many gallant actions were performed by the flotilla.
Two torpedoes were seen to take effect on enemy vessels as the
result of the attacks of the Fourth Flotilla, one being from
Spitfire (Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny), and the
other from either Ardent (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden),
Ambuscade (Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles) or
Garland (Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff).
The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla (Captain Anselan
J. B. Stirling) was admirably executed. The squadron attacked, which
consisted of six large vessels, besides light cruisers, and
comprised vessels of the " Kaiser " class, was taken by surprise. A
large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at the second
and third ships in the line ; those fired at the third ship took
effect, and she was observed to blow up. A second attack made twenty
minutes later by Maenad (Commander John P. Champion) on the
five vessels still remaining, resulted in the fourth ship in the
line being also hit.
The destroyers were under a heavy fire from the light cruisers on
reaching the rear of the line, but the Onslaught
(Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C.) was the only vessel
which received any material injuries. In the Onslaught Sub-Lieutenant
Harry W. A. Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G. Arnot, R.N.R.,
the only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship
successfully out of action and reached her home port.
During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla, Castor
(Commodore James R. P. Hawksley) leading the flotilla, engaged
and sank an enemy torpedoboat-destroyer at point-blank range.
Sir David Beatty reports :—
The Thirteenth Flotilla, under the command of Captain
James U. Farie, in Champion, took station astern of the
battle fleet for the night. At 0.30 a.m. on Thursday, 1st June, a
large vessel crossed the
rear of the
flotilla at high speed. She passed close to Petard and
Turbulent, switched on searchlights and opened a heavy fire,
which disabled Turbulent. At 3.30 a.m. Champion
for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. Moresby reports
four ships of " Deutschland
sighted at 2.35 a.m., at whom she fired one torpedo. Two minutes
later an explosion was felt by Moresby and Obdurate.
Fearless and the 1st
Flotilla were very usefully employed as a submarine screen during
the earlier part of the 31st May. At 6.10 p.m., when joining the
Battle Fleet, Fearless was unable to follow the battle
cruisers without fouling the battleships, and therefore took station
at the rear of the line. She sighted during the night a battleship
" Kaiser " class steaming
fast and entirely alone. She was not able to engage her, but
believes she was attacked by destroyers further astern. A heavy
explosion was observed astern not long after."
There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer
flotillas ; they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had
formed of them.
Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light
Cruiser Squadron in the rear of the battle fleet was in close action
for about 15 minutes at 10.20 p.m. with a squadron comprising one
enemy cruiser and four light cruisers, during which period
Southampton and Dublin (Captain Albert C. Scott) suffered
rather heavy casualties, although their steaming and fighting
qualities were not impaired. The return fire of the squadron
appeared to be very effective.
Abdiel, ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried
out her duties with the success which has always characterised her
PROCEEDINGS ON 1st JUNE.
At daylight, 1st June, the battle fleet, being then to the
southward and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in
search of enemy vessels and for the purpose of collecting our own
cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. Vice-Admiral Sir
Cecil Burney transferred his flag from Marlborough to
Revenge, as the former ship had some difficulty in keeping up
the speed of the squadron. Marlborough was detached by my
direction to a base, successfully driving off an enemy submarine
attack en route. The visibility early on 1st June (three to four
miles) was less than on 31st May, and the torpedo-boat destroyers,
being out of visual touch, did not rejoin until 9 a.m. The British
Fleet remained in the proximity of the battlefield and near the line
of approach to German ports until 11 a.m. on 1st June, in spite of
the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the danger
incurred in waters adjacent to enemy coasts from submarines and
torpedo craft. The enemy, however, made no sign, and I was
reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had
returned into port. Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our position must have been
known to the enemy, as at 4 a.m. the Fleet engaged a Zeppelin for
about five minutes, during which time she had ample opportunity to
note and subsequently report the position and course of the British
The waters from the latitude of the Horn Reef to the scene of the
action were thoroughly searched, and some survivors from the
destroyers Ardent (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden),
Fortune (Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry), and Tipperary
(Captain (D) Charles J. Wintour), were picked up, and the
Sparrowhawk (Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins), which had
been in a collision and was no longer seaworthy, was sunk after her
crew had been taken off. A large amount of wreckage was seen, but no
enemy ships, and at 1.15 p.m., it being evident that the German
Fleet had succeeded in returning to port, course was shaped for our
bases, which were reached without further incident on Friday, 2nd
June. A cruiser squadron was detached to search for Warrior,
which vessel had been abandoned whilst in tow of Engadine on
her way to the base owing to bad weather setting in and the vessel
becoming unseaworthy, but no trace of her was discovered, and a
further subsequent search by a light cruiser squadron having failed
to locate her, it is evident that she foundered.
Sir David Beatty reports in regard to the Engadine as
follows : —
The work of Engadine appears to have been most
praiseworthy throughout, and of great value. Lieutenant-Commander C.
G. Robinson deserves great credit for the skilful and seamanlike
manner in which he handled his ship. He actually towed Warrior
for 75 miles between 8.40 p.m., 31st May, and 7.15 a.m., 1st
June, and was instrumental in saving the lives of her ship's
I fully endorse his remarks.
The Fleet fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9.30
p.m. on 2nd June was reported ready for further action.
The conditions of low visibility under which the day action took
place and the approach of darkness enhance the difficulty of giving
an accurate report of the damage inflicted or the names of the ships
sunk by our forces, but after a most careful examination of the
evidence of all officers, who testified to seeing enemy vessels
actually sink, and personal interviews with a large number of these
officers, I am of opinion that the list shown in the enclosure gives
the minimum in regard to numbers, though it is possibly not entirely
accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, especially those
which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the vessels
sunk, it is unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously
damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack.
I deeply regret to report the loss of H.M. ships Queen Mary,
Indefatigable, Invincible, Defence, Black Prince, Warrior, and
of H.M. T.B.D 's Tipperary, Ardent, Fortune, Shark, Sparrowhawk,
and Turbulent, and still more do I regret the resultant heavy
loss of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers
as Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., Rear-Admiral The Hon.
Horace Hood, Captain Charles F. Sowerby, Captain Cecil I. Prowse,
Captain Arthur L. Cay, Captain Thomas P. Bonham, Captain Charles J.
Wintour, and Captain Stanley V. Ellis, and those who perished with
them, is a serious loss to the Navy and to the country. They led
officers and men who were equally gallant, and whose death is
mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their
duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire.
The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of him. We
particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled German
light cruiser which passed down the British line shortly after
deployment, under a heavy fire, which was returned by the only gun
left in action.
THE PERSONNEL OF THE FLEET.
The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night
actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do them
justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious
traditions of of the past were most worthily upheld—whether in heavy
ships, cruisers, light cruisers, or destroyers—the same admirable
spirit prevailed. Officers and men were cool and determined, with a
cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The
heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all.
I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of
the Fleet filled me.
Details of the work of the various ships during action have now
been given. It must never be forgotten, however, that the prelude to
action is the work of the engine-room department, and that during
action the officers and men of that department perform their most
important duties without the incentive which a knowledge of the
course of the action gives to those on deck. The qualities of
discipline and endurance are taxed to the utmost under these
conditions, and they were, as always, most fully maintained
throughout the operations under review. Several ships attained
speeds that had never before been reached, thus showing very clearly
their high state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material were
conspicuous by their absence, and several instances are reported of
magnificent work on the part of the engine-room departments of
The artisan ratings also carried out much valuable work during
and after the action ; they could not have done better.
The work of the medical officers of the Fleet, carried out very
largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely admirable
and invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials for
performing critical operations, and with their staff seriously
depleted by casualties, they worked untiringly and with the greatest
success. To them we owe a deep debt of gratitude.
It will be seen that the hardest fighting fell to the lot of the
Battle Cruiser Fleet (the units of which were less heavily armoured
than their opponents), the Fifth Battle Squadron, the First Cruiser
Squadron, Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron and the Flotillas. This was
inevitable under the conditions, and the squadrons and flotillas
mentioned, as well as the individual vessels composing them, were
handled with conspicuous ability, as were also the 1st, 2nd and 4th
Squadrons of the Battle Fleet and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.
I desire to place on record my high appreciation of the manner in
which all the vessels were handled. The conditions were such as to
call for great skill and ability, quick judgment and decisions, and
this was conspicuous throughout the day.
I beg also to draw special attention to the services rendered by
Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (Second in Command of the Grand Fleet)
Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee,
Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff,
Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson and Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt,
commanding squadrons or divisions in the Battle Fleet. They acted
throughout with skill and judgment. Sir Cecil Burney's Squadron
owing to its position was able to see more of the enemy Battle Fleet
than the other battle squadrons, and under a leader who has rendered
me most valuable and loyal assistance at all times the squadron did
excellent work. The magnificent squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral
Evan-Thomas formed a support of great value to Sir David Beatty
during the afternoon, and was brought into action in rear of the
Battle Fleet in the most judicious manner in the evening.
Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant
leadership, firm determination and correct strategic insight. He
appreciated the situations at once on sighting first the enemy's
lighter forces, then his battle cruisers and finally his battle
fleet. I can fully sympathise with his feelings when the evening
mist and fading light robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for
which he had manoeuvred, and for which the vessels in company with
him had striven so hard. The services rendered by him, not only on
this, but on two previous occasions, have been of the very greatest
Sir David Beatty brings to my notice the brilliant support
afforded him by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas; the magnificent
manner in which Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace Hood brought his
squadron into action, the able support afforded him by Rear-Admiral
William C. Pakenham and Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, and the
good work performed by the Light Cruiser Squadrons under the command
respectively of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan D. W. Napier, Commodore
William E. Goodenough and Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair. He
states that on every occasion these officers anticipated his wishes
and used their forces to the best possible effect.
I most fully endorse all his remarks, and I forward also the
following extract from his report regarding the valuable services
rendered by his staff : —
I desire to record and bring to your notice the great
assistance that I received on a day of great anxiety and strain from
my Chief of the Staff, Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, whose good
judgment was of the greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My
Flag-Commander, the Hon. Reginald A. R. Plunkett, was most valuable
in observing the effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take
advantage of the enemy's discomfiture ; my Secretary, Frank T. Spickernell, who made accurate notes of events as they occurred,
which proved of the utmost value in keeping the situation clearly
before me ; my Flag Lieutenant-Commander Ralph F. Seymour, who
maintained efficient communications under the most difficult
circumstances despite the fact that his signalling appliances were
continually shot away. All these officers carried out their duties
with great coolness on the manoeuvring platform,where they were
fully exposed to the enemy's fire
I cannot close this despatch without recording the brilliant work
of my Chief of the Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden, K.C.B.,
C.V.O. Throughout a period of 21 months of war his services have
been of inestimable value. His good judgment, his long experience in
fleets, special gift for organisation, and his capacity for
unlimited work, have all been of the greatest assistance to me, and
have relieved me of much of the anxiety inseparable from the conduct
of the Fleet during the war. In the stages leading up to the Fleet
Action and during and after the action he was always at hand to
assist, and his judgment never at fault. I owe him more than I can
My special thanks are due also to Commodore Lionel Halsey, C.M.G.,
the Captain of the Fleet, who also assists me in the working of the
Fleet at sea, and to whose good organisation is largely due the
rapidity with which the fleet was fuelled and replenished with
ammunition on return to its bases. He was of much assistance to me
during the action.
Commander Charles M. Forbes, my Flag-Commander, and Commander
Roger M. Bellairs, of my Staff, plotted the movements of the two
fleets with rapidity and accuracy as reports were received;
Commander the Hon. Matthew R. Best, M.V.O., of my Staff, acted as
observer aloft throughout the action, and his services were of
value. These officers carried out their duties with much efficiency
during the action.
The signals were worked with smoothness and rapidity by Commander
Alexander R. W. Woods, assisted by the other signal officers, and
all ships responded remarkably well under difficult conditions. The
signal departments in all ships deserve great credit for their work.
My Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Fitzherbert, was
also of much service to me throughout the action.
The high state of efficiency of the W.T. arrangements of the
fleet, and the facility with which they were worked before, during
and after the action, is a great testimony to the indefatigable work
carried out by Commander Richard L. Nicholson. His services have
been invaluable throughout the war.
A special word of praise is due to the wireless departments in
My Secretaries, Fleet Paymasters Hamnet H. Share, C.B., and
Victor H. T. Weekes, recorded with accuracy salient features of the
action. Their records have been of much assistance.
To the Master of the Fleet, Captain Oliver E. Leggett, I am
indebted for the accuracy with which he kept the reckoning
throughout the operations.
In a separate despatch I propose to bring to the notice of their
Lordships the names of officers and men all of whom did not come
under my personal observation, but who had the opportunity of
specially distinguishing themselves.
I append the full text of Sir David Beatty's report to me, from
which, as will be seen, I have made copious extracts in order to
make my narrative continuous and complete.*
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
J. R. JELLICOE, Admiral
[enclosure.] List of Enemy Vessels put out of action, 31 May—1
BATTLESHIPS OR BATTLE CRUISERS.
Battleships, " Dreadnought " type.
1 Battleship, "
Deutschland " type.
(Seen to sink.)
1 Battle Cruiser.
(Sunk—" Liitzow " admitted by Germans.)
l Battleship, "
Dreadnought " type.
1 Battle Cruiser.
(Seen to be so severely damaged as to render it extremely
doubtful if they could reach port.)
5 Light Cruisers.
(Seen to sink ; one of them had the appearance of being a larger
type, and might have been a battleship.)
6 Torpedo-boat Destroyers.
(Seen to sink.)
3 Torpedo-boat Destroyers.
(Seen to be so severely damaged as to render it extremely
doubtful if they could reach port.)
note.—The list of Ships and Commanding Officers which took
part in the action has been withheld from publication for the
present in accordance with practice.
The British, 30th May, 1916
FLEET FLAGSHIP: Iron Duke
2ND BATTLE SQUADRON
King George V ( Vice-Admiral Sir
Martyn Jerram )
Ajax, Centurion, Erin.
Orion ( Rear- Admiral A.C. Leveson )
Monarch, Conqueror, Thunderer.
4TH BATTLE SQUADRON
Iron Duke (Admiral Sir John Jellicoe)
Sir Doveton Sturdee)
1st BATTLE SQUADRON
Marlborough. (Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney)
E. F. A. Gaunt)
Collingwood, Neptune, St. Vincent.
ATTACHED BATTLE CRUISERS
3RD BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON
Invincible (Rear-Admiral The Hon. H. L. A. Hood)
1st Cruiser Squadron:
Defence (Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot)
2nd Cruiser Squadron:
Minotaur (Rear-Admiral H. L. Heath)
Hampshire, Cochrane, Shannon.
4th Light Cruiser Squadron:
(Commodore C. E. Le Mesurier)
Boadicea, Blanche, Bellona, Active, Canterbury, Chester.
Faulknor (Captain A. J. B. Stirling)
Marksman, Obedient, Maenad, Opal, Mary Rose, Marvel, Menace,
Munster, Nonsuch, Noble, Mischief.
Castor (Light Cruiser) (Commodore J. R. P. Hawksley)
Kempenfelt, Ossory, Mystic, Moon, Morning Star, Magic, Mounsey,
Mandate, Marne, Minion, Manners, Michael, Mons, Martial, Milbrook.
(Captain C. J. Wintour)
Broke, Sparrowhawk, Achates, Contest, Porpoise,
Acasta, Unity, Ophelia,
Ambuscade, Owl, Ardent,
Hardy, Fortune, Midge.
ATTACHED TO BATTLE FLEET
BATTLE CRUISER FLEET
FLEET FLAGSHIP: Lion (Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty)
1ST BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON
Princess Royal (Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock)
2ND BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON
New Zealand (Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham)
5TH BATTLE SQUADRON
Barham. (Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas)
1st Light Cruiser Squadron
(Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair)
Phaeton, Inconstant, Cordelia.
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron
(Commodore W. E. E. Goodenough)
Nottingham, Dublin, Birmingham.
3rd Light Cruiser Squadron
Falmouth (Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier)
Yarmouth, Birkenhead, Gloucester.
Fearless (Light Cruiser) (Captain C. D. Roper)
Acheron, Ariel Attack ,Hydra, Badger, Goshawk, Defender, Lizard ,
Champion (Light Cruiser) (Captain J. U. Farie)
Nestor, Nomad, Narborough, Obdurate, Petard, Pelican, Nerissa,
Onslow, Moresby, Nicator.
Ninth and Tenth Flotillas
Lydiard (Commander M. L. Goldsmith)Liberty,
Boy Cornwell VC
British Medal Guide