War Office, November 25, 1873.
THE following Despatch has been received at the War Office from Major-General Sir
Garnet Joseph Wolseley, C.B., K.C.M.G., Commanding the Troops on the Gold Coast:—
 

SIR,
    ON the 27th instant I had the honour to inform you that in consequence of information I had received, I had ordered reconnaissances to be made towards the site of the Ashanti Camp at Mampon, and was about to move with a force of 250 blue-jackets and Marines in the direction of Dunquah.
     I had received definite intelligence on the 25th and 26th from many sources which left no doubt on my mind that the camp at Mampon was being broken up, and that the Ashantees were desirous of making their way to the Prah. Reconnaissances, which I had ordered from Abrakrampa, had come on the signs of recent Ashanti encampments on the road leading from Mampon to Dunquah, and it was evident that detached portions of the enemy's forces were moving in that direction, My information led me to believe that two chiefs had been sent by this road passing some six miles to the north of Abrakrampa, and that finding the road closed at Dunquah and Mansue, they had halted and encamped in the bush, and were waiting for further instructions from the head-quarters still in rear.
    As it was impossible that very large masses of the enemy could already have reached the neighbourhood of Dunquah, owing to the time required for the passage of large bodies of men with baggage and sick along the narrow bush tracks, in which the march must be in single file, I considered that a favourable opportunity offered itself for attacking such portion of the force as had arrived near Dunquah, while, at the same time, I resolved to harass and press upon the rear of the troops marching out of Mampon. I accordingly ordered the movement to be carried out which I have now the honour to report.
    A detachment (25th October) of 50 men of the 2nd West India Regiment, and two 7-pr. guns, with Houssa gunners (Rait's Artillery), marched from Cape Coast' for Dunquah, arriving there on the morning of the 26th.
    A reconnaissance (26th October) was made by the Native Forces at Napoleon in the direction of Mampon without any satisfactory results. A reconnaissance from Abbaye moved to near Mampon, and ascertained that there were Ashantis, though only a comparatively small number, still in the camp. Several empty camps were passed by the reconnoitring party, who returned as far as Simeo.
    Lieutenant-Colonel Wood marched from Elmina at daybreak with all the troops (leaving Elmina to be garrisoned by H.M.S. " Druid") to support the reconnaissance from Abbaye. He reported that our allies, the Aquafoos, positively refused to follow up the Ashantis. A force of 250 marines and blue jackets and 100 Russell's Foot moved from Cape Coast to Assayboo, at the junction of
the roads to Abrakrampa and Dunquah, and encamped there.
    I accompanied this force with my head-quarter staff.
    A reconnaissance (27th October) from Napoleon, conducted by a native officer, and composed of native levies, found no trace of Ashantis.
    Lieutenant-Colonel Wood returned to Elmina from the front, reporting the native troops composing his command so untrustworthy that he could not attempt any further movement, even upon rear of the enemy.
    Lieutenant-Colonel Festing advanced from Dunquah with all the force at his disposal, as per margin ^N, in the direction of the Ashanti Camp to which I have already alluded. He completely surprised the enemy, entered their camp while they were cooking and evidently utterly unprepared for an attack. They escaped into the bush, from which they kept up a continuous fire upon Lieutenant-Colonel's Testing's detachment. After destroying the camp and inflicting considerable loss upon the enemy, Lieutenant-Colonel Festing returned to Dunquah. On our side one man only was killed. None of the officers, except Captain Godwin, 103rd Fusiliers, who commanded the Anamaboes, and but few of the men, are more than slightly wounded.
   Lieutenant-Colonel Festing, whose report of the action I have the honour to enclose, draws attention to the conduct of the native levies. The Anamaboes and " perhaps" one other tribe fought well, but as a general rule more than verbal persuasion had to be resorted to to make the natives fight at all.
    During Colonel Festing's absence a detachment of the 2nd West India Regiment advanced from Accroful and garrisoned Dunquah.
    I moved with the force at Assayboo upon Abrakrampa, sending out strong reconnaissances of native allies from Abrakrampa in the directions
of Quacodayo, Anisa, and Assanchi, to feel the enemy in every direction. Some few prisoners were taken who were apparently stragglers seeking
food.
    I had this day (28th October) planned a combined movement from Abrakrampa and Dunquah against the Ashantis attacked on the previous day by Lieutenant-Colonel Festing, but the combination which would, I consider, have inflicted a serious disaster upon the enemy, failed, owing
to the untrustworthy character of our native allies. They were ordered by Lieutenant-Colonel Festing, on the night of the 27th, to be ready to march at daybreak; but when that time came they made excuses, alleging that they were footsore and tired, though the previous day's march had been under 8 miles, and they could not be got to move at any time during the morning, in spite of the exertions of the English, officers present among them.
    In anticipation of Lieutenant-Colonel Festing's simultaneous movement I advanced at daybreak from Abrakrampa upon Assanchi, sending out the King of Abrah's men in front, and leaving a garrison of 50 marines and blue-jackets in Abrakrampa.
    On arriving at Assanchi, about 6 miles, we halted for more than two hours. No news of any movement on Lieutenant- Colonel Festing's part
arrived.
    The scouts in front reported no firing; and soon after noon I returned with the force to Abrakrampa, leaving the Houssas at Assanchi until our native Abrah allies should return. Advancing on the road from Iscabio to Dunquah these Abrah people were met by Ashanti scouts, and, to their great disgrace, the whole body, except nine men, deserted Lieutenant Pollard, R.N., the officer attached to the King of Abrah.
    These nine men escorted him to Acroful, whence he returned next morning to Abrakrampa.
    The Houssas under Lieutenant Gordon, 98th Regiment, advanced from Assanchi to support Lieutenant Pollard, whose cowardly native followers had, when they fell back, reported themselves cut off from him. They did not return till late in the night.
    In the course of the day native scouts dispatched from Abbaye reported that they had found Mampon deserted; but this information was subsequently found to be false.
    During the 28th (29th October) I had received information that the main body of the Ashantis was about Essiecroom and Beulah on the Sweet
River, north of Napoleon; and that it was the intention of Amonquartier, the Commander-in- Chief, to attack Abrakrampa with a battalion of disciplined troops. I might have taken the initiative and attacked him in his camp with confidence in a successful result; but such a course was out of the question with no force at my disposal but a handful of white men, and our worthless native allies; I could not keep the whole of the Marines and blue-jackets waiting an indefinite time at Abrakrampa, and I therefore left to garrison Abrakrampa 25 Marines and 25 bluejackets, under command of Lieutenant Wills, R.N., detailed for this service by the Senior Naval Officer, and marched the remainder to Assayboo, whence on the 30th, they returned to Cape Coast and re-embarked on board Her Majesty's ships.
    Reconnaissances of native troops were made from Napoleon and Abbaye on the 29th and 30th. Mampon was found to be still held, but the main body had moved to a point nearer Napoleon.
    I have thought it necessary to leave a small garrison of European troops at Abrakrampa, because it has been repeatedly stated by prisoners that it is the deliberate intention of Amonquartier to attack that place, its people having harassed Ashanti foraging parties. Major Baker Russell
is in command, with about 200 of his own Native Regiment, 80 Houssas under Lieutenant Gordon, and 300 of our Abrah allies, in addition to the 50 Marines and blue-jackets; and as the post is well provisioned and strongly entrenched, with the bush cleared round it, the garrison are well able to resist the attack of any number of the enemy.
    My movements have all been directed at one end. It has been my object to avoid heading the Ashantis in their retreat, and at the same time to make as much display of our European force as possible in various directions. I desire not only to hasten the enemy's retreat, which is necessary before I can advance beyond Mansue, but to appear to be driving him out of the country, in hopes that I may thus instil some spirit into the Fantees, and induce them to rise and harass the retiring enemy, as, would they do so, they might inflict very heavy losses upon him. At the same time I have done all in my power to spare the European troops and sailors undue fatigue.
    My position is somewhat humiliating. The enemy's main column of retreat is within an easy march of my head-quarters, and I have no force capable of attacking it. Yet on the whole I am somewhat better placed than I had hoped to be. In two actions we have surprised and defeated our enemies. They have broken up their camp at Mampon, which was a standing menace to Cape Coast and Elmina. They are commencing to retire to their own country, and, in consequence of the strong posts we have established on the main road by which they came,' they are compelled to seek another way for their retreat.
    On the other hand, every day's bitter experience teaches me the utter worthlessness of the native allies, from whom I had expected some little help, and convinces me more and more fully that no decisive blow can be struck at the Ashantis, and this war can never be brought to an end except by disciplined European troops.

I have, &c., G. J. WOLSELEY, Major-General.

The Right Honourable The Secretary of State for War, War Office.

Inclosure 1.
Camp at Dunquah,
27th October, 1873.

SIR,
   I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Major-General Commanding, that in compliance with his order, I assembled the whole of the available forces of this post (strength as per margin), ^N and marched along the haunted road yesterday morning. A heavy thunderstorm fell, drenching everyone to the skin, shortly after we started. The noise of' the falling rain and the thunder acted in our favour, as it prevented our advance being heard by the Ashantee, who had formed a camp of considerable size near a place called Escabio.
   We took a prisoner on the road whom, under penalty of death, we made escort us to the camp, and were fortunate enough to come upon them by creeping along rapidly and quietly, without being suspected. In fact, we completely surprised them whilst they were busily engaged preparing their mid-day meal, and rushed in amongst them, as quickly as they rushed out, leaving us in possession.
    We at once brought a 7-pr. gun and rocket trough into action, and continued to engage the enemy (who filled the surrounding bush) with a hot fire for about a couple of hours, after which I advanced some of the 2nd West India Regiment, who poured a heavy fire into them from their Sniders.
    During the sharp action we inflicted a heavy loss upon, the Ashantees.
    As it was becoming late, after destroying their camp, we collected our forces and returned to Dunquah, whither we arrived at sunset. The Anamaboes fought well, and perhaps the same may be said of another tribe, but as a general rule more than verbal persuasion had to be resorted to, to make the natives fight at all, whilst great numbers carefully abstained from taking part.
    All the English officers strove with great energy, and behaved most creditably throughout the day.
    Five out of ten combatant officers were wounded with gunshot, one native was killed, and 48 men wounded (Medical Return forwarded)  The Ashantees continued a heavy fire till the close of the action.

Inclosure 2.
Camp at Dunquah,
28th October, 1873.

NOMINAL RETURN OF KILLED AND WOUNDED.

5 Officers wounded.
4 Soldiers of the 2nd West India Regiment wounded, none killed.

Native Allies.
Abrahs.—180 engaged. None killed, 16 wounded.
Dunkerahs.—56 engaged. None killed, 2 wounded.
Assins.—183 engaged. None killed, 1 wounded.
Anamaboes.—220 engaged. 1 killed, 23 wounded, including the King.

Names of the Wounded Officers.
Colonel Festing, gunshot wound of the left thigh, slight.
Captain Godwin, gunshot wound in the left groin, severe.
Captain Haynes, gunshot wound of the lower lip, slight.
Sub-Lieutenant Filleter, gunshot wound of left thigh, slight.
Sub-Lieutenant Lang, gunshot contusion of left foot, slight.
Serjeant-Major Eyan, 2nd West India Regiment, gunshot wound of the neck, severe.
 

Colonial Office, November 25, 1 873.
THE following Despatch has been received at the Colonial Office from Major-General
Sir G. J. Wolseley, the Administrator of the Coast :—
Government House, Gold Coast, October 31, 1873.

MY LORD,
    IN concluding my letter to your Lordship by the last mail, I mentioned that intelligence had reached me that the Ashantees had become alarmed by the indications of force on many sides of them, which they supposed that they had discovered, and that they were anxious to fall back as rapidly as possible beyond the Prah. I stated also that I hoped, if circumstances favoured me, to take some slight advantage of the exaggerated impression which had thus been created by our previous movements.
    I have now to report that my anticipations have been realised more fully than I could have hoped.
    I enclose a copy of report from Colonel Festing, which will give you details of a surprise effected by him, under instructions which I had given him, of the camp of one of the retreating columns.
    In order to co-operate with this attempt, so that no blow might be struck whilst any support which I could supply was out of reach, and in order at the same time to harass if possible some one or other of the dispersed forces of the Ashantees, I myself moved to the north with all the force which I could collect, including all that Captain Freemantle was able to place at my disposal. I had the additional motive for this movement, that I am particularly anxious continually to display white troops along our main road of advance towards the Prah, both in order actually to make it secure from all attack, and for political purposes to give confidence to the Fantee tribes.
    It did not happen that any of the Ashantee columns in fact passed along this road ; nor could I in the least base my calculations on the certainty of movements which I well knew would be modified from day to day. But by placing troops in positions from which they were able to annoy and retard the retreat of small fractions of the enemy by whatever way they might move, I have succeeded in inflicting, as your Lordship will perceive, a certain amount both of loss and indignity upon them, of which I am endeavouring to take advantage in a Proclamation which I have just issued, and of which I enclose a copy.
    Our movements were very simple. On the evening of the 26th I marched from here and encamped with 260 blue jackets and marines, and 100 of " Russell's" regiment at Asayboo. ^N On the 27th I marched early in the morning to Abrakrampa, and remained there during the day to watch the movements of the various Ashantee columns during their retreat. On this day Colonel Festing surprised the camp at Escabio. On the the 28th we marched to Assajee (Assanchi ?) We now had a fraction of the Ashantees between us and the natives under Colonel Festing. Had it been possible for him to co-operate with us we should have completely crushed those whom he had on the previous day surprised, and who having been dispersed were still lurking about in the bush. But his allies refused to stir, and the opportunity was consequently lost. I remained at Assanchi till noon, sending out scouts in all directions, but finding no force in its immediate neighbourhood I returned the same afternoon to Abrakrampa. Having remained there till noon on the -30th, I returned to Cape Coast, being unwilling to keep in the field for any longer time a body of seamen and marines who could ill be spared for a lengthened period from the fleet. Moreover I had accomplished my main purpose in their employment. My intention is to show European troops as often and in as many directions as possible, but at the same time to let as large a portion as possible of the actual fighting and marching fall upon the native levies really, using the Europeans as little as possible for any exhausting work. This, however, involves the inevitable and constant exposure of the officers with natives, and together with the necessity for almost everything being done in each fight by the individual exertion of officers explains the large proportion of slight wounds which your Lordship will observe among the officers, I am happy to say, however, that all the wounds are merely trifling, with the exception of Captain Godwin's. At the same time these constant wounds, however trifling, for the time prevent officers in such a climate as this, from being able to carry on their duties, and entail the necessity for having a very large reserve of officers to fall back upon.
    The enemy having announced their intention to take and destroy Abrakrampa, against which they have a special spite, I left there 50 marines and blue jackets as a temporary measure. These men will leave Abrakrampa on their return to Cape Coast Castle to-morrow morning,
    Our native allies cannot as yet be much depended upon, but their spirit has unmistakably been raised by the result of our operations up to the present moment, and every day gives me indication of a rising enthusiasm, which I hope to foster, and which, had I any thoroughly dependable power with which to back it, might be no inconsiderable element in the forces on which I might count in our contest. The most important fact to my mind in the success of Colonel Festing's movement is, that it should have been secured with no other assistance than that of 50 of the West India Regiment and native levies, although a large portion of the native allies behaved exceedingly ill, and were with great difficulty induced by the great exertions and constant exposure of the European officers to face the Ashantees. Moreover, as your Lordship will perceive, no better indication could be afforded than is furnished by the incidents of this little campaign of the impossibility of relying for any movements to be accomplished within a given period upon native levies alone. Had I been able to secure the co-operation of the allies under Colonel Festing's command, on the 28th, after their success on the 27th, I should have been able to crush up as considerable a section of the Ashantee, as I should in any case have ventured to deal with. The slender nature of the support on which I can, under the best circumstances, rely from this source deprived me altogether of this opportunity.
    The main object of the Proclamation is, as you will perceive, to induce the Fautee tribes to sweep down from all sides upon the Ashantees during their passage. I am sending it to all the Kings and Chiefs whom I can reach. But no Chief or King will stir without a European officer to advise and assist him, as he knows well his people will not face the Ashantees without a white man to lead them.